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Response
Treaty Termination as Foreign Affairs
Exceptionalism
Jean Galbraith
The written Constitution does not specify how treaties are to be
terminated any more than it specifies how laws are to be terminated. So what
process is required to terminate treaties? Back in the 1800s, the consensus
among the political branches was that action by one or both houses of
Congress was required, with debate centering on whether the appropriate
action was a congressional statute, presidential action combined with the
advice and consent of the Senate, or either of these approaches.1
But today the constitutional practice is very different. The President
now claims and regularly exercises the power to terminate treaties without
any form of congressional approval, at least where this termination accords
with international law. Presidents have unilaterally taken the United States
out of many treaties, with the two most controversial instances being
President Carter’s termination of our mutual defense treaty with Taiwan and
President George W. Bush’s termination of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
with Russia. In essence, constitutional practice has flipped from requiring
congressional approval for treaty termination to now almost never including
it.
In Treaty Termination and Historical Gloss, Curtis Bradley explores
when, how, and why this shift has taken place.2 He comprehensively
examines the practice of treaty termination from the Founding to the present

* Assistant Professor, Rutgers School of Law (Camden). I thank Beth Stephens for comments.
1. Curtis A. Bradley, Treaty Termination and Historical Gloss, 92 TEXAS L. REV. 773, 789–
90, 791–92, 793–96 (2014).
2. See Bradley, supra note 1.
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day, looking over time at how treaties have been terminated and at the
accompanying constitutional analysis used by government actors and
scholars. Professor Bradley concludes that, starting around the end of the
nineteenth century, intermittent, low-stakes actions by the Executive Branch
in relation to treaty termination laid the foundation for broader claims of a
presidential power to terminate treaties. From the 1930s onward, presidents
increasingly exercised this power with regard to relatively uncontroversial
termination decisions that received little, if any, attention from Congress.
President Carter both relied on and further cemented this accrued practice in
his high-stakes decision with respect to the Taiwan treaty.
By itself, Professor Bradley’s description of the changing constitutional
practice of treaty termination is an important contribution. His account is an
exceptionally comprehensive, deeply researched, and evenhanded appraisal;
one that will inform any further debates regarding treaty termination in the
political branches (as well as in the courts, should they ever treat the issue as
justiciable). There are other accounts out there,3 but this one is the most
authoritative to date.
Professor Bradley goes further, however, in relating this account of
treaty termination to broader themes of constitutional construction. This
further contribution has two significant components. First, Professor Bradley
places his account of treaty termination within a descriptive theory of how
historical practice shapes constitutional norms. In prior work with Trevor
Morrison, Professor Bradley developed a theory of how constitutional
practice in the political branches tends to work to the President’s advantage
over time.4 Here, Professor Bradley offers treaty termination as an example
of this theory in action and further illustrates how the constitutional evolution
predicted by this theory can lie somewhere between gradualism and
punctuated equilibrium. Second, Professor Bradley reflects on the legitimacy
of such constitutional developments. He focuses more on identifying
normative pros and cons than on assigning them weight, but as a descriptive
matter he accepts that the President does indeed now have the constitutional
power to terminate treaties when this termination complies with international
law.
Professor Bradley thus combines a narrowly focused doctrinal account
of treaty termination with a broad theory of historical practice in
constitutional interpretation. I am largely sympathetic to this approach. But
I think Professor Bradley’s account underplays a crucial middle layer that
mediates and shapes the connections between treaty termination and the

3. E.g., DAVID GRAY ADLER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE TERMINATION OF TREATIES
(1986); David A. Schnitzer, Note, Into Justice Jackson’s Twilight: A Constitutional and Historical
Analysis of Treaty Termination, 101 GEO. L.J. 243, 264–69 (2012).
4. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation
of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012).
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historical gloss. This is the role that the foreign relations context of treaty
termination has played in enabling the dramatic constitutional change that
took place with regard to it.
In the first Part of this Response, I describe how the constitutional
change that took place in treaty termination falls within three more general
themes in the foreign affairs context. These are (1) the role of international
law in constitutional interpretation; (2) the twentieth-century rise of
executive power; and (3) the reluctance of the courts to interfere with
executive decision making. These themes are acknowledged in Professor
Bradley’s article, but I believe they deserve even more emphasis.
In the second Part of this Response, I argue that the changing
constitutional practice in treaty termination bears little resemblance to Justice
Frankfurter’s articulation of the “historical gloss.” Rather, this practice
reveals a far more dramatic shift than Justice Frankfurter would view as
legitimate. I suggest that the foreign affairs context of treaty termination is
crucial to understanding why such a significant shift in practice has been
allowed to occur. In my view, it is an instance of what Professor Bradley has
elsewhere called “foreign affairs exceptionalism”—specialized constitutional
practice in the context of foreign affairs. 5 Professor Bradley has been critical
of foreign affairs exceptionalism, but his account of treaty termination may
serve to support its validity. For foreign affairs exceptionalism is itself a
creature of historical practice. Therefore, to the extent that historical practice
serves as a descriptive—and potentially normative—basis of constitutional
meaning, it can ground not only our current practice of treaty interpretation,
but also foreign affairs exceptionalism more generally.
I.

Treaty Termination in Context

What caused the practice of treaty termination to change? Here, I link
this change to three broader themes in foreign relations law: the role of
international law in constitutional interpretation, the rise of executive power
in the first half of the twentieth century, and the reluctance of courts to
challenge executive decision making. These are all themes that appear in
Professor Bradley’s article, but they do so largely in passing, in contrast to
the attention given to his broader theory of presidential accruals of power in
the face of congressional acquiescence.

5. E.g., Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-SelfExecution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1582–86 (2003) [hereinafter Bradley, International
Delegations]; Curtis A. Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law?, 70 U. COLO. L. REV.
1089, 1096–97 (1999) [hereinafter Bradley, Foreign Affairs].
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A. International Law in Constitutional Interpretation.
Like foreign relations law more generally, treaty termination involves
issues both of international law and of U.S. domestic law. One can regard
the boundary between these two areas of law as sealed, with the international
and constitutional law issues having no influence on each other. Or, instead,
one can regard this boundary as porous, with the international law issue
influencing the constitutional one and, sometimes perhaps, vice versa.6
Professor Bradley frames his account in a way that initially suggests a
sealed boundary. He describes the rules of international law on treaty
termination but emphasizes that international law does not address the
process by which the United States makes its treaty termination decisions.7
Yet, in reading his historical account, the impression of a far more porous
boundary develops. International law appears to have influenced the
resolution of the domestic constitutional question in at least two ways.
First, as Professor Bradley notes,8 the fact that international law often
authorized treaty termination (as well as related issues like treaty suspension)
made the constitutional issue appear murky and therefore reduced resistance
to constitutional change. The fact that treaty termination decisions by the
President complied with international law—and sometimes prevented
conflicts between congressional statutes or policy and international law—
offered a mantle of legitimacy that both explained presidential action and
helped forestall criticism of it. As treaties increasingly came to include
discretionary withdrawal clauses, the Executive Branch could frame
withdrawal “as a mere normal incident in the conduct of foreign relations.”9
In essence, international law served as, what I have elsewhere called, a
source of “extra-constitutional” legitimacy—a justification for presidential
action that headed off political opposition that could otherwise have arisen
around the constitutional question.10
Second, at points along the way, the Executive Branch explicitly relied
on international law to legitimize its doctrinal view of executive
constitutional power. Consider the following passage from a 1936
Department of State Memorandum:

6. This concept of a porous doctrinal boundary between international and domestic law
resembles the political science concept of a “two-level game” whereby international negotiating
conditions can influence domestic ones and vice versa. See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and
Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427, 433–34 (1988).
7. Bradley, supra note 1, at 776–79.
8. Id. at 830–31 (“The overlay of a mix of international law rules governing treaty termination,
as well as potential distinctions between suspension and termination . . . have also made presidential
unilateralism relating to the issue a more complicated target to assess and criticize.”).
9. 2 CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED
BY THE UNITED STATES 1520 (2d rev. ed. 1945).
10. Jean Galbraith, International Law and the Domestic Separation of Powers, 99 VA. L. REV.
987, 998–1001 (2013).
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A contention that the action of the President in denouncing a treaty must
be submitted to either the Senate or the Congress for ratification
presupposes that action by one or the other of them is necessary to give
validity to the action of the President. This argument, however, would
seem to be questionable for the reason that when the President has given
notice of the desire of this Government to terminate a treaty, the failure
of the Congress or the Senate to approve does not alter the situation.
The notice has already been given and the foreign government may
decline to accept a withdrawal of such notice.11

This passage elides the international and constitutional law questions, in
essence bootstrapping the justification for the President’s constitutional
power to terminate treaties onto the methods recognized by international law
for terminating treaties. Along these same lines, the Executive Branch relied
on the President’s sovereign power as the sole organ of foreign relations—a
doctrine that is largely a creature of international law12—to justify his
constitutional power to terminate treaties without congressional approval.13
Indeed, at times the Executive Branch even mischaracterized doctrinal
precedents in international law as doctrinal precedents in constitutional law
in order to justify its constitutional position.14
Such uses—and sometimes misuses—of international law to accrue
constitutional power to the Executive Branch are common in foreign
relations law. I have shown elsewhere how they help account for the rise in
presidential power in the areas of recognition, war powers, and sole
executive agreements—all of which, like treaty termination, are aspects of
foreign relations law.15

11. Memorandum from Green Haywood Hackworth, Legal Advisor of the Dep’t of State,
Abrogation of Treaties (Jan. 27, 1936), quoted in 5 GREEN HAYWOOD HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 328 (1943).
12. Galbraith, supra note 10, at 1012–15.
13. See, e.g., Letter from Robert Moore, Acting Sec’y of State, to Fred Biermann, U.S. Rep.
(Aug. 19, 1939), quoted in 5 GREEN HAYWOOD HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
331–32 (1943) (rooting the President’s power to terminate treaties in general concepts of
sovereignty and in the Supreme Court’s Curtiss-Wright decision, which emphasized the sole organ
powers of the President).
14. See Bradley, supra note 1, at 796–97, 806 n.186 (describing how the Executive Branch
points to treaties that ended during the Madison and Wilson Administrations as historical precedents
for the constitutional power of the President to terminate treaties when, in fact, these treaties were
terminated based on the international laws and customs of the time).
15. See generally Galbraith, supra note 10. Interestingly, international law continues to play a
robust role in determining the boundary of what the President can and cannot do in treaty
termination, see Bradley, supra note 1, at 823 (quoting the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law as providing the closest description of the current state of the U.S. constitutional law regarding
treaty termination), while in these other areas of foreign relations law its role is now obscured, see
Galbraith, supra note 10, at 1033–42.
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B. The Twentieth-Century Rise in Executive Power.
The first half of the twentieth century brought about a sharp rise in the
President’s foreign affairs powers. This rise has many possible causes,
including the energetic presidencies of Theodore and later Franklin
Roosevelt; the growing importance of the United States on the world stage;
the increased interconnectedness of world affairs; and the Supreme Court’s
embrace of executive foreign affairs powers in Curtiss-Wright and related
cases.16
The shift in constitutional practice in treaty termination can be seen as
one piece of this broader picture. Professor Bradley documents this shift as
falling squarely within this same time period, as the caveated precursors to
unilateral executive treaty termination are succeeded by straightforward
exercise of that power beginning in 1927, and increasing rapidly during the
FDR Administration.17 Indeed, this increased power with regard to treaty
termination not only occurred amid a general expansion of the President’s
foreign affairs power but also within a specific expansion of his powers
related to international agreements. During this same time period, the reach
of sole executive agreements entered into by the President increased
markedly;18 the President first asserted and exercised the power to use ex post
congressional–executive agreements as a substitute for Article II treaties
(thus enabling the United States to enter into major agreements where
majority support in the Senate fell below the two-thirds mark),19 and the
Supreme Court planted the seeds of its current, substantial practice of
deference to the Executive Branch on treaty interpretation.20
C. The Reluctance of Courts to Interfere with Executive Decision Making.
The third theme from broader foreign relations law reflected in the
history of treaty termination is the traditional reluctance of the Supreme
Court to interfere with presidential decision making in the foreign affairs

16. See generally David Gartner, Foreign Relations, Strategic Doctrine, and Presidential
Power, 63 ALA. L. REV. 499 (2012); David Golove, From Versailles to San Francisco: The
Revolutionary Transformation of the War Powers, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1491 (1999); G. Edward
White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1
(1999). The President’s domestic powers of course increased during this time period as well, but
with this increase coming largely through explicit congressional delegations.
17. Bradley, supra note 1, at 805–07.
18. See, e.g., Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non)Treaty Power, 77 N.C.
L. REV. 133 (1998) (documenting a number of executive agreements entered into during the first
half of the twentieth century).
19. See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799,
805–08 (1995) (discussing how several early twentieth century scholars intensely argued for the
interchangeability between congressional–executive agreements and treaties).
20. Michael P. Van Alstine, Treaties in the Supreme Court: 1901–1945, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 191, 217 (Davis L. Sloss, Michael
D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge eds. 2011).
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context. Professor Bradley mentions this theme,21 and it is on evident display
in Goldwater v. Carter. Confronted with the chance to address the
President’s constitutional power to terminate treaties, the Court squarely
declined to do so (though without a majority for any single theory of nonjusticiability).22 The Court’s reluctance here contrasts markedly with its
willingness to interfere with historical practice in the domestic context, as
illustrated a few years later in I.N.S. v. Chadha.23
II. Treaty Termination, Foreign Affairs, and Historical Gloss
In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, Justice Frankfurter defended
constitutional practice as a “gloss” on executive power where this practice
revealed “the way the [constitutional] framework has consistently operated”
and “[d]eeply embedded traditional ways of conducting government.”24
Interestingly, the historical practice on treaty termination explored here by
Professor Bradley bears little resemblance to this gloss. This practice does
not reveal deeply embedded, consistent interpretations, but rather striking
departures from early interpretations.
What do we make of this? As a descriptive matter, Professor Bradley’s
account makes clear that historical practice can sometimes lead to truly
dramatic shifts in the balance of power between branches. His work with
Professor Morrison helps explain why the Executive usually gains in these
shifts, but it does not provide much fine-tuned guidance as to which shifts
will happen and which ones will not happen.
I suggest here that the fact that treaty termination is a matter of foreign
relations law is crucial to understanding why such a dramatic shift in practice
has been tolerated. It is an instance of what Professor Bradley has described
elsewhere as “foreign affairs exceptionalism,” meaning “the idea that foreign
affairs powers should be subject to different, and generally more relaxed,
constitutional restraints than domestic powers.”25 Professor Bradley roots
this doctrine largely in developments from 1920–1940, although his
discussions of its development have focused on Supreme Court decisions like
Curtiss-Wright rather than changes in Executive Branch practice.26
The rise of unilateral presidential power to terminate treaties bears clear
indicia of foreign affairs exceptionalism. The themes outlined in the prior
section—of entanglement with international law issues, of the growth of
executive foreign affairs powers, and of judicial reluctance to interfere with
21. See Bradley, supra note 1, at 785–86.
22. See generally Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
23. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). As Justice White noted in dissent, the holding did implicate some
foreign relations law statutes. Id. at 968 (White, J., dissenting).
24. 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
25. Bradley, International Delegations, supra note 5, at 1582–83.
26. See id. at 1583.
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the Executive’s foreign affairs decision making—are themes that seem
collectively necessary to the constitutional change in treaty making, and that
are largely particular to the foreign affairs context. Indeed, the very time
period that Professor Bradley associates with the rise of foreign affairs
exceptionalism—the 1920s to the 1940s—is exactly the same time period in
which he grounds the shift in practice on treaty termination. The same
principles that animated the Curtiss-Wright decision of deference to the
Executive’s powers on foreign affairs and emphasis on functionalism are on
display in the shift to unilateral presidential power to terminate treaties, and
the decision in Curtiss-Wright itself served to reinforce this reasoning.27
Understanding the change in treaty termination as foreign affairs
exceptionalism helps explain why practice in treaty termination has taken
such a different turn from practice in statutory termination. The practice in
treaty termination has changed dramatically; the practice in statutory
termination has not. While the Constitution’s text might offer stronger basis
for presidential termination of treaties than of statutes,28 the historical
practice explored by Professor Bradley suggests that the foreign affairs
context of treaty termination played an essential role. This context has made
presidents more comfortable pushing the boundaries of past precedents;
Congress more tolerant of these developments; and the Supreme Court more
wary of intervening.
In my view, the change in practice in treaty termination is better
explained by foreign affairs exceptionalism than by Professor Bradley and
Morrison’s generalized constitutional theory of how historical practice can
develop. Of course, the answer is not a purely binary one. Professor Bradley
notes the role of foreign affairs exceptionalism in explaining the shift in
practice in treaty termination, observing that, “when constitutional
controversies implicate foreign relations,” themes of practice-based
presidential accruals of power “are particularly common.” 29 Conversely, I
accept that these themes can be found in certain other areas of the separation
of powers, of which Professor Bradley suggests some examples.30 What
makes the foreign affairs context unique is the frequency, scale, and
importance of practice-based shifts in favor of presidential power.

27. See Letter from Robert Moore, supra note 13.
28. See Kristen E. Eichensehr, Treaty Termination and the Separation of Powers, 53 VA. J.
INT’L L. 247, 250–51 (2013) (noting the use of parallels to the Appointments Clause).
29. Bradley, supra note 1, at 785; see also Bradley & Morrison, supra note 4, at 461–76 (using
two, out of a total of three, foreign affairs examples to illustrate their theory of practice-based
constitutional change).
30. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 4, at 476–84 (discussing the power to remove officials
whose appointment the Senate has advised and consented to, although noting that this example
involves more judicial involvement than in the foreign affairs examples they offer); see also
Bradley, supra note 1, at 785–86 (offering examples of the pocket veto, the pardon power, and
executive privilege as areas where executive practice matters).
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Indeed, foreign affairs exceptionalism is itself an instance of practicebased constitutional development. The historical practice that has led to
unilateral presidential power to terminate treaties—and to stronger
presidential war powers, recognition powers, and powers to make
international agreements and set U.S. foreign policy—has also led more
generally to specialized treatment of foreign affairs law within our
constitutional framework. An important question today is whether foreign
relations law should have such specialized treatment or instead be
approached in the same way as purely domestic constitutional issues. In the
past, Professor Bradley has been wary of foreign affairs exceptionalism. 31
Yet if one accepts that historical practice gives rise to valid constitutional
interpretations (even if reserving judgment on the normative desirability of
shifts in historical practice),32 then historical practice can serve as a
justification for foreign affairs exceptionalism. The sanction of history lies
over foreign affairs exceptionalism, just as it does over the narrower matter
of practice in treaty termination.
Of course, neither the current practice of treaty termination nor foreign
affairs exceptionalism more generally may be well suited to the needs of the
present day. Professor Bradley has criticized foreign affairs exceptionalism
as out of date in light of “the erosion in recent years of the distinction
between domestic and foreign affairs.”33 The Supreme Court’s recent
assertiveness in cases involving foreign affairs suggests that a majority of the
Justices may be sympathetic to this view. A recent, striking example is the
Court’s decision that the political question doctrine does not apply to the
recognition power—a decision which nowhere cited Justice Rehnquist’s
plurality opinion in Goldwater v. Carter and nowhere suggested that the
foreign affairs context of the case mattered.34 I think that there is still
something to this distinction, and that, in any event, the best solution to its
erosion may involve changes to both traditionally domestic and foreign
affairs constitutional principles rather than only to the latter. If one accepts
that foreign affairs exceptionalism should end, however, then this would
suggest that the doctrines that have developed through foreign affairs
exceptionalism—such as presidential power over treaty termination—should
perhaps also end. Now that treaties have increased implications for domestic

31. E.g., Bradley, Foreign Affairs, supra note 5, at 1104–05.
32. E.g., Bradley, supra note 1, at 823 (accepting that the best description of the current state of
constitutional law is that the President can terminate treaties without congressional approval if this
termination accords with international law); id. at 827, 830 (declining to address normative
implications).
33. Bradley, Foreign Affairs, supra note 5, at 1105.
34. See Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012). The concurring opinion of Justice
Sotomayor and the dissenting opinion of Justice Breyer do cite Goldwater v. Carter and note the
foreign affairs context. See id. at 1433 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 1437 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
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affairs (and now that at least some international agreements are done through
ex post congressional–executive agreements that are akin to statutes),
perhaps it is more important than formerly to have congressional sanction for
their termination.
These issues await the future. Professor Bradley’s excellent article
reminds us that constitutional practice can change dramatically, at least in the
foreign affairs context. It remains to be seen whether such a change will
affect how foreign relations law itself is understood within our broader
constitutional structure.

